It addirittura sorts of arguments against the thesis that constitution is identity apply durante such per case

It addirittura sorts of arguments against the thesis that constitution is identity apply durante such per case

Some philosophers find it important or at least expedient to frame the issue con terms of the case of a statue \(s\) and piece of clay \(c\) that coincide throughout their entire existence. We bring both \(c\) and \(s\) into existence by joining two other pieces of clay together, or we do something else that guarantees total coincidence. It seems that total coincidence is supposed puro lend plausibility sicuro the claim that, in such verso case at least, constitution is identity (and hence NI is false – Gibbard 1975). For example, \(s\) may be admired for its aesthetic traits, even long after it ceases to exist, but this need not be true of \(c\). And \(s\) has the property, which \(c\) lacks, of being destroyed if squeezed into a ball. Those who defend the thesis that constitution is identity need preciso defend it durante the general case of partial coincidence; and those who attack the thesis do so with arguments that rete informatica equal well against both total and partial coincidence. The assumption that \(s\) and \(c\) are totally coincident is therefore inessential.

The doctrine of temporal parts offers only limited help. The statement that \(c\) is identical preciso \(s_1\)on day 1 but identical sicuro \(s_2\) on day 2 can be construed to mean that \(c\) is a temporally extended object whose day 1 tirocinio is identical onesto \(s_1\) and whose day 2 stage is identical puro \(s_2\). Similarly, we can regard \(s_2\) as a temporally extended object that overlaps \(c\) on day 2 and \(c’\) on day 3. But unless temporal parts theorists are prepared puro defend a doctrine of modally extended objects – objects extended through possible worlds analogous to objects extended mediante time, there remains per problem. \(s_2\) might have been made of verso different piece of clay, as is con fact the case on day 3. That is, it is logically possible for \(s_2\) to fail preciso coincide with the day 2 stage of \(c\). But it is not logically possible for the day 2 stage of \(c\) preciso fail esatto coincide with itself.

Since the two stages are not identical, NI does not apply

Lewis recognizes this difficulty and proposes esatto deal with it by appealing puro his counterpart theory (Lewis 1971, 1986, and 1993). Different concepts, addirittura.g., statue and piece of clay are associated with different counterpart relations and hence with different criteria of trans-world identity. The property determined by a modal predicate may be affected by the subject term of a sentence containing the predicate. The subject term denotes an object belonging sicuro this or that kind or sort. But different kinds or sorts may determine different properties (or different counterpart relations). Con particular, the properties determined by the predicate ‘might not have coincided with \(c_2\)’ (where \(c_2\) names the day 2 stage of \(c)\) per the following sentences,

This has the effect of rendering modal predicates “Abelardian” (Noonan 1991, 1993)

  1. \(s_2\) might not have coincided with \(c_2\),
  2. \(c_2\) might not have coincided with \(c_2\),

are different, and hence (a) and (b) are compatible, even assuming that \(s_2\) and \(c_2\) are identical. (It should be emphasized that counterpart theory is not the only means get it on on-line of obtaining Abelardian predicates. See Noonan 1991.)

The upshot seems esatto be that that the advocate of the standard account of identity must maintain either that constitution is not identity or that modal predicates are Abelardian. The latter option may be the fruitful one, since for one thing it seems esatto have applications that go beyond the issue of constitution.

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